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AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND A
CLEAN FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON STATE
Kirsten Nelsen

Abstract: Transportation fuel is the greatest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions in
Washington State. To curb emissions, Governor Jay Inslee has charged the Washington State
Department of Ecology with developing a Clean Fuel Standard (“CFS”) proposal, which may
be proposed in future legislative sessions. The goal of a CFS is to reduce the overall carbon
intensity of transportation fuel. California enacted a similar program in 2010—the low
carbon fuel standard—which was challenged in federal court. One issue that remains open is
whether a state low carbon fuel standard would be preempted by the federal Clean Air Act.
This Essay considers whether the Clean Air Act would preempt a CFS in Washington. It
concludes that a Washington CFS is unlikely to conflict with the purpose of any portion of
the Clean Air Act and is therefore unlikely to be preempted.

INTRODUCTION
The Washington State Legislature enacted a bill in 2008 that pledges
to reduce state greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions to 1990 levels by
2020. 1 The bill requires further reductions in GHG emissions in 2035
and 2050. 2 Although it does not target specific industries, the bill will
likely impact the transportation sector, the greatest contributor to GHG
emissions in the state. 3 For this reason, Governor Jay Inslee has
announced that he will propose several strategies to decrease carbon
pollution from transportation. 4 One of the governor’s potential policies
is a Clean Fuel Standard (“CFS”), 5 a regulatory scheme that would

1. Act effective June 12, 2008, ch. 14, § 3, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 172 (regarding Greenhouse
Gas Emissions) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE. § 70.235.020(1)(a)(i)) (2014).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.235.020(1)(a)(ii)–(iii) (2014).
3. GAIL SANDLIN, WASHINGTON STATE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS INVENTORY 2009–2010
7–8 (2012), available at https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/1202034.pdf (last
visited Feb. 18, 2015).
4. JAY INSLEE, POLICY BRIEF: WASHINGTON CARBON POLLUTION REDUCTION AND CLEAN
ENERGY
LEADERSHIP
1–2
(Dec.
14,
2014),
available
at
http://www.governor.wa.gov/documents/Carbon_package_overview_2015.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
2015).
5. Id.

57
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reduce the carbon intensity of transportation fuels. 6
Opponents to a CFS in Washington will likely challenge it on the
basis of federal preemption under the Clean Air Act. California enacted
a similar low carbon regulatory scheme, 7 which was the topic of over
five years of litigation challenging the authority of the state to enact the
standard. 8 In part, the plaintiffs claimed the California regulations were
preempted by the federal Clean Air Act. 9 Under the Clean Air Act, states
cannot adopt fuel regulations that conflict with federal standards. 10
However, California is explicitly exempt from the fuel preemption
provision of the statute. 11 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
briefly considered California’s exemption from federal preemption
under the Clean Air Act in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 12
but it did not analyze whether a low carbon fuel standard would have
been preempted if enacted by a state that did not have the same
exemption as California. 13 Further, the court declined to answer whether
the California regulations were preempted by another subsection of the
Clean Air Act, namely Section 211(o) codifying the Energy
Independence and Security Act (“EISA”). 14 These are two issues that
would likely affect implementation of a CFS in Washington State.
This Essay considers whether a Washington CFS, if enacted, would
be in danger of federal preemption under the Clean Air Act. Part I
explains what a CFS in Washington would look like and how it
compares to the California standard, which is likely to form the basis for
the Washington CFS. Part II details the applicable federal preemption
6. JENNIFER PONT & STEFAN UNNASCH, A CLEAN FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON STATE:
REVISED ANALYSIS WITH UPDATED ASSUMPTIONS 39 (2014).
7. California adopted the Low Carbon Fuel Standard (“LCFS”), a set of regulations very similar
to a CFS in Washington.
8. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013); Rocky
Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1086 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Rocky
Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, Nos. 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM, 1:10-cv-163-LJO-BAM,
2014 WL 7004725, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014).
9. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
10. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4) (2012); see also Arnold W.
Reitze Jr., The Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives Under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, 29
TULSA L.J. 485, 486 (1994) (detailing the development of federal preemption of fuel regulation
throughout the Clean Air Act amendments).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B) (2012).
12. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1106 (finding that although California is exempt from the express fuel
preemption provision, it was not excused from compliance with the dormant commerce clause,
which was the deciding issue in the case).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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doctrine and the history of preemption provisions in the Clean Air Act.
Part III discusses the litigation arising out of the California standard,
which clarifies the challenges and potential resolutions to these
challenges in Washington. Finally, Part IV analyzes the open federal
preemption issues, considering likely challenges to a CFS in
Washington. This Essay concludes that it is unlikely that a court would
find that the federal Clean Air Act would preempt a Washington CFS
regulatory scheme. This Essay aims to inform those in Washington, as
well as those in other states attempting to enact similar fuel standards.
I.

A CLEAN FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON

Governor Inslee has taken steps toward proposing a CFS in
Washington as a strategy to reduce carbon emissions. In February 2015,
the Governor directed the Washington State Department of Ecology
(“DOE”) to engage in public outreach and discussion surrounding the
potential passage of a CFS. 15 He did this before official legislation was
proposed and prior to any rulemaking by DOE. 16 Governor Inslee also
commissioned an updated report analyzing the impacts of a CFS in
Washington 17 and listed it as a potential proposal to decrease carbon
emissions in the state. 18 These actions indicate that the Governor is
seriously considering a CFS in Washington. Although there has been no
official proposal for a CFS in Washington, this section will briefly
outline the potential policy based on reports commissioned by the
Governor and information released by the DOE, which suggest the
standard will be similar to the low carbon fuel standard in California.
California is the only state that has adopted a regulatory scheme that
is substantially similar to one that may be proposed in Washington. 19
15. News Release, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Washingtonians Can Join Discussion on Clean Fuel
Standard (Feb. 4, 2015), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2015/013.html.
16. Id.
17. PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 1.
18. JAY INSLEE, POLICY BRIEF: WASHINGTON CARBON POLLUTION REDUCTION AND CLEAN
ENERGY
LEADERSHIP
1–2
(Dec.
14,
2014)
available
at
http://www.governor.wa.gov/documents/Carbon_package_overview_2015.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
2015).
19. See JENNIFER PONT & JEFF ROSENFELD, A LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON:
INFORMING THE DECISION 9, 48 (Feb. 18, 2011); see also PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 9
(drawing on the experience of California’s CFS—also known as California’s low carbon fuel
standard—to analyze market impacts of a CFS in Washington); James M. Van Nostrand & Anne
Marie Hirschberger, Biofuels, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 445,
447 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 §§ 95480–95490 (2015) (California’s
Low Carbon Fuel Standard).
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California’s standard aims to reduce GHG emissions by lowering the
carbon intensity of transportation fuels. 20 The “carbon intensity” of a
transportation fuel is “the amount of lifecycle [GHG] emissions per unit
of energy of fuel.” 21 The lifecycle GHG emissions analysis takes into
account the direct emissions—emissions from producing and burning the
fuel—as well as any indirect emissions, which include land use
changes. 22 Emissions related to the full fuel lifecycle are part of the
calculation, including “all stages of fuel and feedstock production and
distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction through the
distribution and delivery and ultimate consumer, where the mass values
for all greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global
warming potential.” 23 By employing a lifecycle analysis, the California
standard attempts to consider all carbon emissions that are released from
the production and use of transportation fuels.
It is likely that Washington’s CFS would mimic many of the features
of California’s standard because two reports commissioned by the
Washington State Department of Ecology to analyze the impacts of a
CFS draw on California’s low carbon fuel standard for several
assumptions. 24 Like California’s standard, the CFS would require
regulated fuel providers to reduce the average carbon intensity of fuels
by a certain amount over a given period of time. 25 A regulated fuel
provider will receive credits for fuel sold with a carbon intensity
measurement below the standard, and debits for fuel with a carbon
intensity value above the standard. 26 Surplus credits may be sold or
traded to other regulated parties for use in compliance. 27
A calculation of the carbon intensity of each type of fuel requires an
analysis of direct and indirect emissions from the entire lifecycle of the
fuel, not just vehicle emissions. 28 As an illustration, direct emissions can
be broken into two parts: “well-to-tank” and “tank-to-wheel”
emissions. 29 “Well-to-tank” emissions are produced during fuel

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

CAL CODE REGS. tit. 7 § 95480 (2015).
Id. § 95481(16).
See id. § 95481(a)(28) (defining of “lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions”).
Id.
PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 9; PONT & ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 48.
PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
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production and transportation. 30 For example, corn ethanol production
requires tractor fuel, fertilizer production, transport to the ethanol plant,
fuel production emissions, and transport to refueling stations. 31 “Tank to
wheel” emissions, on the other hand, are simply vehicle tailpipe
emissions from individual vehicles. 32
II.

THE FEDERAL CLEAN AIR ACT AND PREEMPTION

A CFS in Washington will likely be challenged under two preemption
doctrines: express and implied preemption.33 First, opponents would
likely argue that the Clean Air Act express fuel preemption provision,
codified at Section 211(c)(4), expressly preempts the ability of
Washington State to enact a CFS. Further, a CFS would likely be
challenged under implied preemption using the federal renewable fuel
standard, codified at Section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act. This section
provides necessary background information regarding: (a) federal
preemption doctrine, and (b) the two provisions in the Clean Air Act that
could trigger federal preemption.
A.

Federal Preemption Doctrine

Federal preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause in Article IV of
the United States Constitution. 34 Federal law may preempt state and
local law either by express terms in statutory language, or by implication
based on a statute’s purpose and structure. 35 State law may be preempted
by explicit language in a statute that makes it clear that Congress
intended federal law to foreclose state action. 36 “Express” preemption
language often requires additional analysis of Congress’ intent. 37

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Opponents to California’s low carbon fuel standard challenged it on implied preemption, but
the issue remains open. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1048–49 (E.D. Cal. 2011). Opponents to a CFS in Washington are likely to also argue express
preemption, however, because unlike California, Washington does not have a waiver from the
express fuel preemption provision in the Clean Air Act. See Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B) (2012).
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land. . . .”).
35. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
36. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
37. See id. at 517 (considering the broader language of the federal act before concluding that the
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Like express preemption, implied preemption requires examination of
more than the text of the statute. There are two types of implied
preemption: field preemption and conflict preemption. 38 Field
preemption occurs when a federal regulatory scheme is “so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it.” 39 Immigration, for example, is an area
exclusively controlled by the federal government. 40 Conflict preemption,
on the other hand, occurs on a smaller scale. 41 Instead of federal
preemption over an entire area of law, as in field preemption, conflict
preemption occurs when a particular state law conflicts with a particular
federal law. 42 A conflict may occur in two ways. First, state and federal
law can create a situation in which it is literally impossible to comply
with both laws. 43 Impossibility preemption is not at issue here because a
CFS would not be in direct conflict with any federal regulation. Second,
even if it is possible to comply with both state and federal law, a state
law may be preempted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 44
“Obstacle” preemption requires a court to make two distinct
determinations: (1) what the original Congressional purpose was in
enacting the federal law, and (2) whether that purpose is impeded by the
state law. 45 Making those determinations often requires a look at the text

express preemption provision did preempt state tort claims); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525 (2001) (considering the history of federal regulation in addition to the express preemption
language in finding that the state law was preempted).
38. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (“Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least
two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption . . . and conflict preemption. . . .”).
39. Id.
40. Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONSTIT.
L.Q. 939, 958 (1995) (discussing the “dormant immigration clause” and noting that “immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing De Canas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)).
41. Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme Court, 89
NEB. L. REV. 682, 684 (2011).
42. Id. at 684–85.
43. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (noting
that “federal exclusion of state law is inescapable . . . where compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility”).
44. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
45. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98–104 (1992) (concluding
that the federal worker safety regulations preempted state regulations because Congress sought to
promote occupational safety “while at the same time avoiding duplicative, and possibly
counterproductive, regulation”); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 222–23 (1986) (finding that a California law regulating nuclear power
development was not preempted because although the primary federal objective was promotion of
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of the statute itself, the legislative history, and the legislative intent.46
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 47 the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the preemptive authority of federal standards that required
auto manufacturers to install passive restraints on some, but not all, 1987
vehicles. 48 The issue was whether a lawsuit based on an injury from a
car that was not required to have such restraints was preempted by the
federal standards. 49 The Court found that the federal objective was to
give the manufacturer a range of choices for passive restraint systems
that would be gradually introduced. 50 The Court considered the federal
regulations in light of the agency rulemaking history and the agency’s
explanation in the Federal Register. 51 Ultimately, the Court held that the
plaintiff’s lawsuit, which imposed a duty on the manufacturers to install
specific passive restraint systems, such as airbags, “would stand as an
‘obstacle’ to the accomplishment” of the federal objectives. 52
Courts are generally reluctant to find a conflict between state and
federal law. A finding of preemption requires a “high threshold” to be
met “if a state law is to be pre-empted for conflicting with the purposes
of a federal Act.” 53 “[H]ypothetical or potential conflict[s]” do not meet
this threshold, 54 and courts are heavily discouraged from “seeking out
conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly
exists.” 55 Therefore, although it can be difficult to determine how a court
will rule in an obstacle preemption case, there is a tendency to find
against federal preemption. 56

nuclear power, a secondary objective was safety, which did not conflict with the state’s goal, which
was economic in nature).
46. Dickinson, supra note 41, at 704.
47. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
48. Id. at 864–65.
49. Id. at 886.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 877–81.
52. Id. at 886.
53. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (citing
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
54. Roce v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).
55. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960)).
56. Dickinson, supra note 41, at 682–83.
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Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 1963 57 after Congress in 1955
declared that air pollution was an issue that should be addressed by state
and local governments. 58 The first iteration of the act charged the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”) with developing
a national research and development program to reduce air pollution
from motor vehicles. 59 HEW was required to “encourage cooperative
activities by the States and local governments for the prevention and
control of air pollution. . . .” 60 Because of this emphasis on cooperation
between a federal agency and state government, the Clean Air Act has
long been known as one of several comprehensive and cooperative
federal environmental statutory schemes. 61
Subsequent amendments continued to encourage the “cooperative
federalism” relationship between states and the federal government. The
first amendment to the Clean Air Act occurred in 1967 and directed each
state to adopt state-specific ambient air standards to reduce various
federally recognized pollutants and to create a plan to achieve those
standards. 62 The standards became known as State Implementation Plans
(“SIPs”). 63 Congress again amended the Clean Air Act in 1970 64 to
“provide for a more effective program to improve the quality of the
Nation’s air.” 65 To speed progress, it developed the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards, which placed limits on the allowed levels of
certain pollutants per cubic meter of air. 66 States were required to

57. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 393 (1963).
58. David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rule Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 740, 744–45 (1983).
59. § 3, 77 Stat. at 394.
60. Id. In 1970, President Nixon created the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by
executive order and gave the new Administrator control over Clean Air Act implementation.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086, 2087 (1970).
61. See Christopher T. Giovinazzo, California’s Global Warming Bill: Will Fuel Economy
Preemption Curb California’s Air Pollution Leadership? 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 893, 899–900 (2003)
(discussing the Clean Air Act’s significant dependence on state cooperation for success).
62. See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, 485–86 (1967) (section titled
“Cooperative Activities and Uniform Laws”); see also Schoenbrod, supra note 58, at 744–45
(discussing Congress’ intent in amending the Clean Air Act in 1967).
63. See Catharine V. Greco, State Implementation Plans Under the 1990 Clean Air Act: Can
New York Conform?, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 869, 870 (1994).
64. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
65. Id.; see also Greco, supra note 63, at 870.
66. § 107, 84 Stat. at 1678; see also Greco, supra note 63, at 873 (explaining the development of
federal air quality standards).
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implement plans to meet these new national air quality standards, which
were generally stricter than the original state standards.
Although the Clean Air Act imposes specific requirements for state
implementation of air quality standards, states are free to adopt air
quality standards more stringent than those provided by federal law. 67
This freedom stems from the section of the Act calling for “Retention of
State Authority.” 68 That section provides that “nothing in this chapter
shall preclude or deny the right of any State . . . to adopt or enforce (1)
any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2)
any applicable implementation plan [not less stringent than the federal
standard].” 69 The Clean Air Act was intended to join the “States and the
Federal Government [as] partners against air pollution.” 70 However, the
cooperative nature of the Clean Air Act is undermined by the express
preemption provisions on fuel regulations and motor vehicle emissions.
Federal preemption may also be implied when a federal law conflicts
with or stands as an obstacle to the goals of Congress in enacting such a
law. 71 The following discussion details sections of the Clean Air Act that
may result in express or implied preemption of a CFS in Washington.
1.

Express Preemption in the Clean Air Act

Despite the substantial history of cooperative federalism at the heart
of the original Clean Air Act, Congress included language in the 1970
amendments that expressly preempted states from regulating in certain
areas. Specifically, the Clean Air Act preempts state regulation of motor
vehicle emissions 72 and state regulation of fuel 73 in certain
67. See Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that states are “free to
adopt air quality standards more stringent than required by the [National Ambient Air Quality
Standards],” but that a state is not required to comply with neighboring states’ more stringent
standards); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d
332, 345 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The federal statutory scheme clearly contemplates that Michigan can
make its air pollution rules as stringent as it likes, and may enforce those rules”).
68. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970 § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012); Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679, 1689 (1970); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-148 § 2, 81 Stat. 485, 497 (1967); see also Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n, Inc. v. Davis, 331 F.3d
665, 670 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the Clean Air Act “generally seeks to preserve state authority
in the area of pollution”).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012).
70. Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990).
71. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (noting
that “federal exclusion of state law is inescapable . . . where compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
72. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012).
73. Id. at § 7545(c)(4).
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circumstances. Both preemption provisions have a special exception for
California. 74
The preemption provision for motor vehicle emissions standards was
born out of Congress’ desire to lighten the compliance burden on the
automobile manufacturing industry. 75 There were two major problems
with states regulating automobile emissions independently from the
federal government. 76 First, states with automobile factories faced
political pressure from the automobile industry to keep regulations lax. 77
These states generally enacted less burdensome standards for fear that
industry would move to other states. 78 Second, some states, such as
California, wanted to enact more stringent automobile emissions
standards. 79 California’s desire for stricter standards came from its
problems with smog and air pollution. 80 The regulatory inconsistency
was a problem for the automobile industry and also had the potential to
cause enforcement problems for states and the federal government. 81
As a result of inconsistent state standards, the automobile industry
lobbied for the creation of federal emissions standards. 82 Pressure from
the automobile industry resulted in passage of an express preemption
provision barring state regulation of motor vehicle emissions in the
Clean Air Act. 83 The provision did, however, include a waiver
California, which traditionally set more stringent standards than the
federal government. 84 The waiver allowed California to continue to set
its own emissions standards as long as they were more stringent than the
federal standards. 85 Later, Congress again amended the Clean Air Act to
allow other states to adopt standards identical to California.86 Today,
74. Id. at § 7543(b), 7545(c)(4)(B).
75. Sarah E. Leatherwood, States Take the Wheel—Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge
Jeep v. Crombie Gives States a Chance to Choose the Direction of Their Automobile Emissions
Regulation, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 669, 673–74 (2008).
76. Id. at 673.
77. Id. at 674.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. (explaining that varying state standards caused two major problems for automobile
manufacturers: the challenge of complying with various regulatory inconsistencies along with the
legal burden and expense).
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also Clean Air Act of 1970 § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012).
84. Leatherwood, supra note 75, at 675.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012).
86. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2012).
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there are only two vehicle emissions standards that individual states can
adopt: the federal standards or the more stringent California standards. 87
Similar to federal preemption of motor vehicle emissions regulations,
the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments expressly preempted state
regulation of fuel in certain circumstances. 88 State regulation of fuel or
fuel additives was preempted when the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) prescribed standards regarding the same fuel or fuel
additive. 89 Like the preemption provision for motor vehicle emissions,
California was again granted a waiver to enact standards more stringent
than those prescribed by the federal government. 90
Notably, when the Clean Air Act was amended in 1990, the new
amendments significantly changed the fuel preemption provision.
Instead of directly regulating a “fuel or fuel additive,” the new
amendments preempted state law that controlled the same “characteristic
or component of a fuel or fuel additive.” 91 This new provision actually
broadened state authority to enact regulations 92 because the pre-1990
provision prevented states from enacting any regulation “respecting use
of a fuel or fuel additive in a motor vehicle” that was regulated by the
EPA. 93 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals repeatedly held that the
legislative history of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments indicated that
Congress was attempting to give more control over fuel regulation to the
states. 94 Furthermore, the EPA regulations were amended to make it
clear that state regulations were only preempted if there was a federal
rule regarding that specific characteristic or component of fuel.95 The
change provided states with more latitude to enact regulations on fuel. 96
87. The two standard approach (federal and California) alleviated some of the problems with the
motor vehicle industry. Instead of needing to comply with different standards for each state, there
are just two standards requiring compliance.
88. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1698 (1970).
89. Reitze, supra note 10, at 486.
90. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B) (2012).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 487.
93. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1699 (1970)
(Section 211(c)(4)(A) of the section titled “Regulation of Fuels”).
94. See Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n, Inc. v. Davis, 331 F.3d 665, 670–71 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The
Clean Air Act generally seeks to preserve state authority.”); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 217 F.3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A number of Senators explained that the
1990 amendments preserved the authority of the states to regulate air pollution.”).
95. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1699 (1970)
(Section 211(c)(4)(A)(ii) of the section titled “Regulation of Fuels”).
96. See, e.g., Davis, 331 F.3d at 669–70 (holding that California’s ban on methyl tertiary-butyl
ether (“MTBE”) in gasoline was not preempted by the Clean Air Act because it was enacted for the
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Today, Section 211 of the Clean Air Act expressly preempts states
from enacting fuel legislation in certain circumstances. 97 State
legislation is preempted if it encompasses “any control or prohibition
respecting any characteristic or component of a fuel or fuel additive in a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine” “for purposes of motor vehicle
emission control.” 98 Controls and prohibitions are only preempted if the
EPA Administrator has prescribed “a control or prohibition applicable to
such characteristic or component of a fuel or fuel additive” and the state
prohibition is not identical to the EPA regulation. 99 Thus, there must be
some federal law that conflicts with the state regulation for the fuel
preemption provision to take effect.
2.

The Renewable Fuel Standard and Potential Implied Preemption in
the Clean Air Act

The renewable fuel standard, which is a separate provision of the
Clean Air Act, may impliedly preempt a CFS in Washington. The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized the EPA to adopt regulations to
ensure that “gasoline sold or introduced into commerce in the United
States . . . contains that applicable volume of renewable fuel. . . .” 100
With authority from this mandate, the EPA developed the renewable fuel
standard program, which was designed to increase the quantity of
renewable fuel used in the United States.101 The original standard
required an increasing percentage of renewable fuel to be blended with
gasoline, with four million gallons of renewable fuel to be incorporated
into the nation’s gasoline supply in 2006 and mandating an increase to
seven and a half billion gallons by 2012. 102 This led to a significant

purpose of protecting groundwater and not for the purpose of emissions control); Exxon Mobil
Corp., 217 F.3d at 1256 (holding that a county requirement in Nevada that gasoline sold during the
winter contain at least 3.5 percent oxygen content by weight did not conflict with, and was not
preempted by, any provision of the Clean Air Act, including provision restricting state power to
regulate and prohibit fuel additives) (citing Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(c)(4)(A) (2012)).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4) (2012).
98. Id. § 7545(c)(4)(A).
99. Id. § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii).
100. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1501(a)(2)(A)(i), 119 Stat. 594, 1068
(2005).
101. RANDY SCHNEPF & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40155, RENEWABLE
FUEL STANDARD (RFS): OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 2–4 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40155.pdf.
102. Id. at 1.
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increase in corn ethanol production. 103
Two years later, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
was enacted to increase energy efficiency and availability of renewable
energy, while requiring more renewable fuels to be mixed with
gasoline. 104 The stated purpose of the Act was to
move the United States toward greater energy independence and
security, to increase the production of clean renewable fuels, to
protect consumers, to increase the efficiency of products,
buildings, and vehicles, to promote research on and deploy
greenhouse gas capture and storage options and to improve the
energy performance of the Federal Government and for other
purposes. 105
The new renewable fuel standard increased the volume of renewable
fuel required to be blended, expanded application to other transportation
fuels, and required EPA to develop a lifecycle greenhouse gas
performance threshold to ensure that renewable fuels emit fewer
greenhouse gases than the petroleum fuels they replace.106 It was
incorporated into the Clean Air Act at Section 211(o). 107 The EPA
updated and issued its final rule to implement the new renewable fuel
standard program on February 3, 2010. 108
The federal renewable fuel standard mandates that renewable fuels be
derived from one of four specific sources: total renewable fuels
(produced from “renewable biomass” including planted crops), advanced
biofuels (biofuels other than ethanol derived from corn starch), cellulosic
and agricultural waste-based biofuel (fuel from cellulose), and biomassbased biodiesel (diesel from biomass feed stocks). 109 Under EPA’s
regulations, renewable fuels mixed with gasoline must meet certain
103. Melissa Powers, King Corn: Will the Renewable Fuel Standard Eventually End Corn
Ethanol’s Reign?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 667, 668 (2010).
104. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, tit. II § 201, 121 Stat.
1492 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012)).
105. Id.
106. SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 101, at 4.
107. Note that the renewable fuel standard (Section 211(o)) is codified in the same section of the
Clean Air Act as the express fuel preemption provision (codified at Section 211(c)) discussed in
Part II.B.2. The fuel preemption provision at Section 211(c) applies only if the EPA has regulated
the same “characteristic or component” of fuel as the state regulation. One could argue that the
renewable fuel standard regulates the same characteristic or component of fuel as a CFS in
Washington. Therefore, the renewable fuel standard is relevant to the express preemption analysis
and is also relevant independently under an implied preemption analysis.
108. Regulations of Fuel and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 40
C.F.R. § 80 (2010).
109. SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 101, at 4.
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lifecycle GHG emissions thresholds for a given category. 110 A lifecycle
analysis under the federal renewable fuel standard is a way to measure
the environmental impact of fuel, which considers direct and significant
indirect emissions from production and transportation. 111 “Total
renewable fuel,” for example, is generally ethanol from corn or
sorghum. 112 The statute mandates that the GHG emissions for total
renewable fuel from new facilities (constructed after the bill was
enacted), as calculated by a lifecycle analysis, must be twenty percent
below that of conventional fuels to qualify. 113 However, the federal
standard exempts existing corn facilities from the GHG lifecycle
requirements. 114 “Advanced biofuels” are derived from non-corn feed
stocks and are required to reduce lifecycle GHG emissions by fifty
percent to qualify. 115
The EPA regulations require a specific proportion of renewable fuels
from each of the four categories. 116 For example, the EPA required 0.004
percent of total renewable fuel volume to be cellulosic biofuel in
2013. 117 Total renewable fuel, generally from corn ethanol, was required
to comprise 9.74 percent of renewable fuel. 118 The requisite proportion
of renewable fuel increases each year, capping at thirty-six billion
gallons by 2022. 119 Fuel refiners, importers, and blenders must meet the
federal standards either by purchasing and blending renewable fuel into
gasoline or by buying credits from other parties. 120
The tension between state and federal power to regulate fuel and
automobile emissions is a constant struggle for courts attempting to
interpret preemption under the Clean Air Act. For example, the Act itself
requires state enforcement of federal air quality standards through State
Implementation Plans. State autonomy is also highlighted in the section
110. Id.; DAVID R. WOOLEY & ELIZABETH M. MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK § 5:60
(2013).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(H) (2012).
112. SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 101, at 4.
113. Id. at 8.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
115. SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 101, at 4.
116. Id.
117. Regulation of Fuels and Fuels Additives: 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards, 78 Fed. Reg.
49,794, 49,798 (Aug. 15, 2013) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80 (2014)).
118. Id.
119. U.S. EPA, REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT, EPA FINALIZES REGULATIONS FOR THE
NATIONAL RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM FOR 2010 AND BEYOND 2 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/420f10007.pdf.
120. Id. at 3–4.
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titled “Retention of State Authority.” 121 This section entitles states to
adopt air quality standards more stringent than those provided by federal
law in many circumstances. 122 The seemingly strong history of state
regulation is undermined by explicit federal preemption over regulation
of fuel and motor vehicle emissions. These preemption provisions have
impeded state efforts to combat climate change and air pollution on
several occasions. 123 Further, because California is often exempt from
preemption, much of the case law allowing state regulation may not
apply to states other than California. It is against this background of
federalism issues that this Essay addresses whether a CFS in
Washington will face preemption under the Clean Air Act.
III. CHALLENGES TO CALIFORNIA’S STANDARD: ROCKY
MOUNTAIN FARMERS UNION V. COREY
A recent line of cases in the Eastern District of California and the
Ninth Circuit that challenged California’s low carbon fuel standard
provides insight into whether a CFS in Washington would be preempted
by the Clean Air Act. The California low carbon fuel standard was
authorized by the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 124
followed by an Executive Order issued by California’s Governor in
January 2007. 125 The act charged the California Air Resources Board
(“CARB”) with developing regulations that would achieve the goal of
reducing GHG emissions from California to 1990 levels by the year
2020. 126 The Executive Order then directed CARB to initiate“a
regulatory proceeding to establish and implement the [low carbon fuel
121. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970 § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012); Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1689 (1970); Air Quality Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-148 § 2, 81 Stat. 485, 497 (1967).
122. See Connecticut v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 656 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that
states are “free to adopt air quality standards more stringent than required by the [National Ambient
Air Quality Standards],” but that a state is not required to comply with neighboring states’ more
stringent standards); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit,
874 F.2d 332, 345 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The federal statutory scheme clearly contemplates that
Michigan can make its air pollution rules as stringent as it likes, and may enforce those rules.”).
123. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 548 F.2d 1088, 1089, 1095 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding that a city regulation setting lead content and volatility standards for gasoline was
preempted); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 421, 429 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that a
state regulation limiting volatility of gasoline was preempted).
124. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 38500–38599 (West 2006).
125.
Cal.
Exec.
Order
No.
S-01-07
(Jan.
18,
2007),
available
at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf.
126. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38501(h), 38550 (2006).
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standard].” 127 CARB obliged, resulting in final adoption of the low
carbon fuel standard in April of 2010. 128 The stated purpose of the new
regulation was to “reduce [GHG] emissions by reducing the full fuelcycle, carbon intensity of the transportation fuel pool used in California,
pursuant to the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.” 129
To fulfill this stated purpose, the California regulations require fuel
providers to reduce the average carbon intensity of fuels by a certain
amount each year.130 The carbon intensity of fuel is calculated using a
lifecycle analysis, which considers the direct and indirect emissions from
fuel production. 131 Regulated parties receive credits for fuel that has a
carbon intensity below the standard, and debits for fuel with a carbon
intensity above the standard. 132 Unlike the federal renewable fuel
standard, which exempts existing corn facilities from the GHG lifecycle
requirements, 133 the California standard imposes the same lifecycle
GHG requirements on all renewable fuels. 134
In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 135 the plaintiffs were
Midwest-based farm associations with an interest in increased regulation
of the corn and soybean ethanol industry. Plaintiffs challenged
California’s low carbon fuel standard on the basis of federal
preemption. 136 Plaintiffs argued that the standard conflicted with the
goals of Congress in enacting the renewable fuel standard, as authorized
by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. 137 The Court
found that although California was exempt from the express fuel
preemption provision under Section 211(c)(4) of the Clean Air Act, this
did not insulate it from a possible implied preemption challenge under
some other section of the Clean Air Act, specifically the renewable fuel
standard at Section 211(o). 138 However, the Court declined to decide
127.
Cal.
Exec.
Order
No.
S-01-07
(Jan.
18.
2007),
available
at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf.
128. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 §§ 95480–95490 (2010) (California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard).
129. Id. § 95480.
130. Id. § 95482(b).
131. Id. § 95481(a)(28) (defining “lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions”).
132. Id. § 95485.
133. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(o)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
134. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95484(b) (2012).
135. 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
136. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1078, 1096 (discussing plaintiffs’
interest in protecting the corn ethanol industry).
137. Id. at 1101.
138. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048–49, 1063 (E.D.
Cal. 2011).
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whether California’s low carbon fuel standard was actually preempted
by the renewable fuel standard because it found that the parties failed to
argue the correct standard of review. Thus, the implied federal
preemption question remains open and will likely be instrumental in any
challenge to a CFS in Washington.
The Court’s analysis and discussion of the federal preemption claim
in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union provides insight into how a court
may analyze a federal preemption challenge to a CFS in Washington.
This section gives a brief explanation of the Court’s reasoning and
conclusions at the District Court level and in the appeal to the Ninth
Circuit.
A.

District Court Proceedings

Plaintiffs at the District Court level in Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union argued that the California low carbon fuel standard was
preempted by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2005 and
the subsequent 2007 amendments, codified at Section 211(o) of the
Clean Air Act. 139 The plaintiffs argued that California’s law was invalid
under obstacle preemption. 140 The Act authorized the EPA to set a
national renewable fuel standard, which requires renewable fuels to be
blended with gasoline. 141 The standard excludes corn ethanol made from
plants constructed before December 19, 2007 from the carbon intensity
requirements imposed on other types of renewable fuels.142 Plaintiffs
argued that the California standard frustrated the purpose of the amended
federal renewable fuel standard.143 Unlike the national standard,
plaintiffs argued, the California standard did not provide an exception
for “first generation” corn ethanol producers. 144 Instead, the California
standard assessed carbon intensity in the same way for all fuels.
Plaintiffs argued that the purpose of the amended federal standard was to
preserve the United States corn ethanol industry, and that the California
standard “interfere[d] with the methods by which the federal statute was
designed to reach [its] goal.” 145
Defendant CARB denied the contention that the California standard
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 1052.
See supra Part II.B.2 and notes 100–20.
Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(o)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1065–66.
Id.
Id. (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992)).
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was preempted by the renewable fuel standard.146 CARB pointed to
California’s preemption waiver in the Clean Air Act, 147 which, CARB
argued, insulated California from all preemption challenges under the
Clean Air Act. 148 CARB maintained that because it was exempt from the
express fuel preemption provision under Section 211(c)(4), it was also
exempt from implied preemption under other parts of the Clean Air Act,
specifically the renewable fuel standard, codified at Section 211(o). The
court addressed this argument in two parts. First, it asked whether the
express fuel preemption provision applied to the California standard.
Second, it asked whether California was exempt from all types of
preemption. 149
The court first analyzed whether the Clean Air Act preemption waiver
for California applied to California’s low carbon fuel standard. 150 The
court split this analysis into three parts based on the text of the fuel
preemption provision: (1) whether the California standard was a control
or regulation “for the purpose of motor vehicle emissions” 151; (2)
whether the standard was a control or prohibition respecting any
“characteristic or component of a fuel or fuel additive” 152; and (3)
whether the standard was a “control respecting any fuel or fuel
additive.” 153 The court answered “yes” to all three questions and found
that the preemption exemption authorized the California standard with
respect to the federal fuels regulations set forth in Section 211(c) of the
Clean Air Act.154 Concluding that California’s standard fit within the
express fuel preemption waiver under Section 211(c)(4), the court
considered whether California’s standard was exempt from preemption
by other portions of the Clean Air Act, namely the renewable fuel
standard, codified at Section 211(o), where there was no express
preemption provision. 155
146. Id. at 1054.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) (“[N]o State . . . may prescribe or attempt to enforce, for
purposes of motor vehicle emission control, any control or prohibition respecting any characteristic
or component of a fuel or fuel additive in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine . . . (ii) if the
Administrator has prescribed . . . a control or prohibition applicable to such characteristic or
component of a fuel or fuel additive.”).
148. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1055.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1057.
153. Id. at 1061.
154. Id. at 1061–62.
155. Id. at 1062.
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The court did not, however, find that California’s preemption waiver
exempted the California standard from preemption analysis under other
federal laws, including other provisions of the Clean Air Act.156 Instead,
it found that “[f]ederal preemption, and California’s preemption
exceptions, differ under each Section 211 subsection.” 157 The court cited
to Davis v. Environmental Protection Agency, 158 which found that
California’s preemption waiver did not exempt California from
preemption analysis under a different subsection of the Clean Air Act,
namely Section 211(k). 159 Therefore, the court found, California’s
exemption from the fuel preemption provision did “not grant California
the authority to enact a regulation that conflicts with the [renewable fuel
standard], as set forth in section 211(o).” 160
Although the court found that California’s exemption from the
express fuel preemption provision under Section 211(c)(4) did not
preclude preemption by the renewable fuel standard in Section 211(o),
the court declined consideration of the implied preemption claim on the
merits because neither party addressed the appropriate standard of
review. 161 Because the court did not decide whether the federal
renewable fuel standard preempted the California low carbon fuel
standard, the parties did not appeal the decision to the Ninth Circuit.
This obstacle preemption issue remains open.
B.

The Ninth Circuit Briefly Addressed Preemption

Rocky Mountain Farmers Union was appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 162 However, because the District Court
did not address whether the renewable fuel standard 163 preempted
California’s low carbon fuel standard, 164 the issue was not brought

156. Id. at 1062 (“Section 211(c)(4)(B) does not authorize California to enact and enforce fuel
standards that conflict with federal laws, including other provisions of the Clean Air Act such as
[the Energy Independence and Security Act], Section 211(o).”).
157. Id.
158. 348 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2003).
159. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (citing Davis, 348 F.3d at 786).
160. Id. at 1063.
161. Id. at 1071.
162. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
163. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012).
164. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (refusing to address whether
California’s low carbon fuel standard was preempted by the Energy Independence and Security Act
because neither party argued the correct standard of review).
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before the Ninth Circuit. 165 The court did note California’s fuel
preemption waiver in the Clean Air Act briefly in its opinion.166 CARB
argued that Section 211(c)(4)(B)—California’s exemption from the
Clean Air Act preemption provision—authorized the low carbon fuel
standard under the Commerce Clause. 167 In rejecting this argument, the
court noted that the California standard fell within the fuel preemption
exemption because it was “a control respecting a fuel or fuel additive
and was enacted for the purpose of emissions control.” 168 The Court did
not address whether there was any federal regulation that would actually
preempt the California standard.
IV. THE CLEAN AIR ACT IS UNLIKELY TO PREEMPT A CLEAN
FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON
The Clean Air Act’s express declaration of federal preemption for
state regulation of fuel additives, 169 combined with the Clean Air Act’s
renewable fuel standard 170 may be used to challenge a CFS in
Washington. 171 State regulation of fuel additives is only preempted if it
conflicts with a federal regulation.172 The federal renewable fuel
standard has the potential to preempt a CFS in Washington. 173 First, this
section will analyze whether a CFS in Washington would be preempted
by the Clean Air Act express fuel preemption provision,
Section 211(c)(4). Second, this section analyzes whether the national
renewable fuel standard—codified at Section 211(o) in the Clean Air
Act—would preempt a CFS in Washington. It concludes that federal
preemption of a CFS in Washington—under both express and implied
preemption—is unlikely.

165. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1107 (“We express no opinion on Plaintiffs’ claim that the Fuel Standard
is preempted by the [renewable fuel standard].”).
166. Id. at 1106.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1061).
169. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(C) (2012).
170. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012).
171. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1065–68. Plaintiffs challenged
California’s low carbon fuel standard based on implied preemption under the federal renewable fuel
standard. Id. The issue was not decided and remains open. Id. Therefore, opponents to a CFS in
Washington will likely attempt preemption based on the renewable fuel standard.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii).
173. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 (plaintiffs argued that the
California low carbon fuel standard stood as an obstacle to Congress’ intent when it enacted section
211(o) of the Clean Air Act—the renewable fuel standard).
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Clean Air Act Express Preemption: Section 211(c)(4)

The Clean Air Act would not expressly preempt a CFS in Washington
because the EPA has not regulated the carbon intensity of fuel. Section
211(c)(4) is the express fuel preemption provision in the Clean Air Act,
but it is merely procedural and not substantive. 174 Under
Section 211(c)(4), the EPA must have regulated the same “characteristic
or component” of fuel as the state regulation for express preemption to
apply. 175 Therefore, the test for express preemption under the statute is
twofold. First, the state law must regulate a “characteristic or
component” of fuel. Here, a court would likely determine that a
Washington CFS would regulate a “characteristic or component” of
fuel. 176 Second, the state law must regulate the same “characteristic or
component” of fuel as federal law. This analysis requires consideration
of a separate, substantive federal regulation to arrive at express
preemption. 177 Opponents of a CFS in Washington will likely point to
the federal renewable fuel standard, codified at Section 211(o). The
pertinent question for this analysis is whether the federal renewable fuel
standard regulates the same “characteristic or component” of fuel as
would be regulated by a CFS in Washington.
Express preemption analysis under Section 211(c)(4) requires more
than a simple look at the plain language of the statute. Courts often
consider the legislative history, purpose, and the broader context of the
statute when interpreting the scope of express preemption language. 178
Here, the analysis requires comparison between the scope of the federal
renewable fuel standard and a CFS in Washington. This section will
compare the two standards by considering the content, along with the
congressional purpose in enacting the two standards. It finds that the
federal standard regulates the source of fuel, focusing on renewables,
and a Washington CFS would regulate the carbon intensity of fuel. It

174. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4).
175. Id. at § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii).
176. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (finding that California’s low
carbon fuel standard regulated a “characteristic or component” of fuel for purposes of the Clean Air
Act.) Because a CFS in Washington would likely mimic California’s standard, a court would also
likely find that a CFS regulates a “characteristic or component” of fuel.
177. Id.
178. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 548 (2001) (considering the history of
federal regulation in addition to the express preemption language in finding that the state law was
preempted); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992) (considering the broader
language of the federal act before concluding that the express preemption provision did preempt
state tort claims).
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concludes that the state standard does not regulate the same
“characteristic or component” of fuel as the federal standard and should
not be preempted.
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit noted that the California low
carbon fuel standard fell within the Clean Air Act fuel preemption
provision. It explained that the California standard was “a control
respecting a fuel or fuel additive and was enacted for the purpose of
emissions control.” 179 However, California’s preemption waiver
exempted the California standard from analysis under the Clean Air
Act’s express fuel preemption provision. 180 The Court simply decided
that California would be exempt from express preemption and therefore
avoided engaging in a full analysis under the preemption provision.
Specifically, the Court did not consider whether the EPA had prescribed
a “control or prohibition respecting any characteristic or component of a
fuel or fuel additive,” as required by the preemption provision. 181 Unlike
California, however, Washington is not exempt from the fuel preemption
provision expressly written in the Clean Air Act. 182 Therefore, an
attempt to enact a CFS in Washington will likely result in a challenge
based on express preemption.
As explained in Part II.B.1, 183 express federal preemption of state
regulation of fuel only occurs when the EPA has “prescribed . . . a
control or prohibition applicable to such characteristic or component of a
fuel or fuel additive.” 184 Such a federal regulation is required for the fuel
preemption provision to come into play. 185 If there is no federal
regulation on point, there is no preemption. 186 Therefore, states may
enact regulations that would fall under the express preemption provision
as long as there is no federal regulation that concerns the same

179. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1077, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation omitted) (citing Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1061).
180. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1106 (citing Davis v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 348 F.3d 772,
786 (9th Cir. 2003)).
181. Id.
182. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(b); 7545(c)(4)(B) (California is the only state exempt from
preemption).
183. See supra notes 72–99.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii).
185. Id.; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 217 F.3d 1246, 1256 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that a county requirement in Nevada that gasoline sold during the winter contain at
least 3.5 percent oxygen content by weight did not conflict with, and was not preempted by, any
provision of the Clean Air Act, including provision restricting state power to regulate and prohibit
fuel additives) (citing Clean Air Act § 211(c)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) (2012)).
186. Id. at 1253–56.
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“characteristic or component” of that particular fuel or fuel additive. 187
This is particularly important to the present analysis. Application of the
express preemption provision to a CFS in Washington requires
consideration of other federal laws regulating carbon intensity of fuel.
The most obvious federal law that may result in express preemption is
the renewable fuel standard.188 As explained in Part II.B.2, 189 the
renewable fuel standard requires that a certain amount of renewable fuel
be blended into transportation fuels each year. 190 The renewable fuel
standard focuses on the source of renewables, requiring fuel vendors to
blend certain volumes of each of the four recognized categories of
renewable fuel into gasoline. 191 The EPA sets volumes for each category
of renewable based on percentage of total renewable fuels.192
By setting volume requirements for each category of renewable fuel,
the renewable fuel standard targets the source of fuel. In large part, the
renewable fuel standard focuses on whether the sources of transportation
fuels are adequately diversified. Congress’ purpose in passing the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 was to “move the United
States toward greater energy independence and security.”193 When
considered in light of the purpose of the Act, source diversification is a
logical approach to achieve the stated goals. It requires a specific
percentage of fuel from planted crops, a certain percentage from biofuels
derived from cornstarch, a percentage from cellulose, and a percentage
of diesel from biomass feed stocks. 194 Thus, the EPA is meeting the
stated purpose of the act by requiring specified volumes of diverse
renewable fuels. 195
In contrast, emphasis on the specific source of renewable fuels is
completely absent from proposals for a Washington CFS. 196 Unlike the
federal standard, Washington would not require certain percentages of

187. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(c)(4)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2012).
188. Id. § 7545(o).
189. See supra notes 100–20.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2) (2012).
191. See supra Part II.B.2.
192. See id.
193. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, tit. II § 201, 121 Stat.
1492, 1519 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012)).
194. SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 101, at 4.
195. See Powers, supra note 103, at 668–69 (explaining that EISA has been “wildly successful”
at reducing United States dependence on foreign oil, but not successful at reducing carbon
emissions).
196. See supra Part I.
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fuel from cellulosic biofuels or planted crops. 197 Instead, a Washington
CFS would focus entirely on the carbon intensity of fuel. As explained
in Part I, the “carbon intensity” of a transportation fuel is the amount of
lifecycle GHG emissions per unit of energy of fuel. 198 Regulated fuel
providers will receive credits for fuel with a carbon intensity value
below the standard, and debits if the carbon intensity value is above the
standard. 199 In other words, the source of renewables is irrelevant to a
CFS. The crux of the policy is its focus on the carbon intensity of fuel.
Thus, the “characteristic or component” that would be regulated by
Washington’s CFS is not the same “characteristic or component” as
regulated by the renewable fuel standard.
The focus on regulating carbon intensity under a CFS is a logical
means to fulfill Washington’s legislatively mandated reductions in state
GHG emissions. 200 Governor Inslee highlighted a CFS as a method to
achieve these reductions. 201 Requiring a reduction in the carbon intensity
of fuel would likely result in statewide GHG emissions reductions.
Therefore, the policy would be designed to achieve statewide goals.
On the other hand, Congress’ stated goal in enacting the renewable
fuel standard was to “move the United States toward greater energy
independence and security.” 202 One major critique of the federal
standard is that it has not effectively reduced GHG emissions from
transportation fuels. 203 For example, the federal standard requires high
volumes of traditional renewable fuels, mainly corn ethanol, to be
blended into fuel. However, corn ethanol may actually emit more GHG
emissions than traditional petroleum-based fuels. 204
Like a CFS, the federal renewable fuel standard does require some
renewable fuels to meet specific GHG emissions thresholds, which are

197. PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 9.
198. See supra Part I.
199. PONT & UNNASCH, supra note 6, at 39 (analysis commissioned by the Washington State
Department of Ecology to determine impacts associated with a CFS in Washington draws on
California’s low carbon fuel standard for several assumptions).
200. H. B. 2815 60th Legis., Reg. Sess (Wash. 2008) (regarding Greenhouse Gas Emissions)
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE. § 70.235.020(1)(a)(i) (2014)).
201. JAY INSLEE, POLICY BRIEF: WASHINGTON CARBON POLLUTION REDUCTION AND CLEAN
ENERGY
LEADERSHIP
1–2
(Dec.
17,
2014),
available
at
http://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/policy_briefs/pb_Carbon_pollution_reduction_2014.
pdf.
202. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, tit. II § 201, 121
Stat. 1492, 1519 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012)).
203. Powers, supra note 103, at 668–69.
204. Id.
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calculated using a lifecycle analysis. 205 However, certain fuels—many
corn-based ethanols, for example—are exempt from the emissions
thresholds. 206 The exemption for corn-based ethanol from the GHG
emission requirements further demonstrates that Congress’ goal was to
reduce dependency on foreign oil by strengthening domestic renewable
fuel sources, rather than to limit GHG emissions. Furthermore, the GHG
emissions threshold is a preliminary step in the regulation. Renewable
fuels in each category are first assessed according to the GHG emissions
threshold. Fuels that meet the required thresholds are then blended with
gasoline based on required volumes of each renewable fuel. Therefore,
the focus of the federal standard is centered on increasing the use of fuel
from non-petroleum-based sources and not on GHG emissions
thresholds. 207
The fuel preemption provision in the Clean Air Act only applies if the
EPA has regulated the same “characteristic or component of a fuel or
fuel additive” as is targeted by the state regulation. 208 The federal
renewable fuel standard does not regulate the same characteristic of fuel
as would be regulated by a Washington CFS. The federal standard
regulates the source of renewable fuels, requiring certain volumes to be
derived from each of four different categories. In contrast, a Washington
CFS would regulate the carbon intensity of renewable fuels. It would not
require percentages from specific sources. This conclusion is further
validated by a look at legislative purpose: Washington’s purpose was to
reduce GHG emissions, while the federal purpose was to move the
United States toward greater energy independence. Therefore, a CFS in
Washington would not be preempted by the federal renewable fuel
standard because they do not regulate the same “characteristic or
component” of fuel, as required by the Clean Air Act.
B.

Clean Air Act Implied Preemption

A CFS in Washington does not “stand as an obstacle to Congress’
objectives” under the federal renewable fuel standard, authorized by the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, and should not be
preempted. Whether a CFS in Washington would be preempted by the
federal renewable fuel standard is an open question following the Ninth

205.
206.
207.
208.

42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
Id.
Powers, supra note 103, at 668.
Clean Air Act of 1970 § 211(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2012).
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Circuit’s decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union. 209 Opponents to a
CFS in Washington will likely use the renewable fuel standard,
Section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act, to argue implied obstacle
preemption. This section analyzes the merits of such an argument and
concludes that the CFS would not be preempted.
Plaintiffs in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union argued that California’s
low carbon fuel standard interfered with “the methods by which the
federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal.” 210 This argument is one
of implied preemption under the federal renewable fuel standard 211 and
is an argument that is likely to be included in a challenge to a CFS in
Washington. Specifically, the question is whether the state law “stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
or objectives of Congress.” 212 Obstacle preemption was never analyzed
in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union because the court found that neither
party addressed the appropriate standard of review. 213
A challenge to a CFS in Washington will likely hinge on obstacle
preemption by the federal renewable fuel standard, authorized by the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. 214 In analyzing whether
a Washington CFS would be preempted by the federal renewable fuel
standard, the question is whether it would “stand[] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes or objectives of
Congress.” 215 As noted earlier, Congress’ stated objective in enacting the
renewable fuel standard was to “move the United States toward greater
energy independence and security.” 216 The question in an obstacle
preemption analysis is whether a CFS in Washington conflicts with
Congress’ purpose in enacting the federal law. 217
A significant difference between California’s standard and the federal
renewable fuel standard in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union was in the
treatment of corn ethanol. This would likely be the most controversial

209. 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013).
210. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1066 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
(citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992)).
211. Id.
212. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (setting the standard for obstacle
preemption).
213. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
214. See supra Part II.B.2.
215. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
216. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, tit. II § 201, 121 Stat.
1492, 1519 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012)).
217. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
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part of the Washington CFS, as well. While the federal standard favors
all renewable fuels, the Washington CFS would only favor renewables
with a low carbon impact. The production of corn ethanol, although
renewable, can actually produce more carbon dioxide than it absorbs in
the atmosphere. 218 Although this may theoretically work to fulfill the
federal purpose by decreasing the United States’ dependence on foreign
oil, it hardly advances Washington’s goal to reduce carbon emissions
from transportation fuel. 219
The issue is one of Congressional purpose. In Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission, 220 for example, the Court found that a California law that
put a moratorium on nuclear power development was not preempted by
a federal law. Although it found that the primary purpose of the federal
law was promotion of nuclear power, it found that a secondary objective
was safety. The Court found that the California objective was economic
in nature. It therefore concluded that the state law’s purpose did not
obstruct the federal purpose to enhance safety. 221
Here, the analysis seems even clearer. The purpose of the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, which authorized the renewable
fuel standard, was plainly stated as moving the United States toward
greater energy independence. 222 As explained in Part IV.A, 223 EPA
requires that fuel providers blend escalating volumes of certain
categories of renewable fuels to achieve this goal. A CFS in Washington
would require an increase in the amount of renewable transportation
fuels used in Washington. A CFS would not require that renewables be
derived from a specific source; it would instead preference renewables
218. See Leah Stiegler, Comment, Avoiding the Catch-22: Reforming the Renewable Fuel
Standard to Protect Freshwater Resources and Promote Energy Independence, 48 U. RICH. L. REV.
1063, 1091 (2014) (arguing that the federal renewable fuel standard favors corn ethanol and that this
has significant environmental impacts); Morgan Brubaker, Comment, Dream of Californication:
Constitutional Questions Put the Brakes on the Nation’s First Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 22 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 57, 65 (2011) (discussing the impact of land conversion from forest or grassland to corn
fields, which generally increases the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere).
219. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM (RFS2)
REGULATORY
IMPACT
ANALYSIS
483
(Feb.
2010),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oms/renewablefuels/420r10006.pdf (analyzing corn ethanol production and
noting that “unless we analyze the lifecycle GHG emissions of corn ethanol over more than 14
years, corn ethanol from this pathway will not achieve a reduction compared to gasoline.”).
220. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
221. Id. at 220–23.
222. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, tit. II § 201, 121
Stat. 1492, 1519 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012)).
223. See supra notes 174–208.
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with a lower carbon intensity. Rather than stand as an obstacle to the
purpose of the federal standard, a CFS in Washington would serve as a
complement. Increased renewable fuels would likely result in greater
energy independence nationwide. At the very least, it does nothing to
impede the federal objectives.
Plaintiffs in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union argued that Congress
intended to ensure a continued nationwide market for corn ethanol by
exempting existing corn ethanol producers from the GHG emissions
threshold requirement. 224 However, this alleged intent appears nowhere
in the legislation, and plaintiffs did not cite to anywhere that it appeared
in the legislative history. For a court to speculate that Congress intended
to bolster nationwide sales of corn ethanol by enacting the renewable
fuel standard is likely a stretch. It also requires that a court ignore the
stated purpose of the Act: to move the United States toward energy
independence.
Far from conflicting with the stated objectives of the federal
renewable fuel standard, a CFS would likely further federal goals. Based
on Supreme Court precedent and consideration of the doctrine’s
reluctance to find preemption of state law, 225 it is unlikely that a court
would find a CFS in Washington preempted.
CONCLUSION
A CFS enacted in Washington State will likely meet resistance from
parties with a financial stake in the current fuel economy. Based on
challenges to the California standard, federal preemption under the
Clean Air Act is likely to be raised to challenge a Washington CFS.
Although the federal renewable fuel standard may appear similar to a
CFS on its face, a court is unlikely to find a Washington CFS preempted.
Under the express preemption standard, a court is unlikely to find that a
Washington CFS would regulate the same characteristic of fuel as the
federal renewable fuel standard, as required by the Clean Air Act fuel
preemption provision, Section 211(c). Unlike the federal standard’s
focus on the source of renewables, a CFS in Washington would regulate
the carbon intensity of fuel. A CFS in Washington would likely also
survive an obstacle preemption analysis under the renewable fuel

224. Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief & Jury Demand, Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union v. Goldstene, No. 1:10-cv-00163-LJO-DLB, 2010 WL 412389, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2,
2010).
225. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (citing
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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standard, Section 211(o) because it does not obstruct Congress’ purpose.
The stated purpose of the federal standard is to move the United States
toward greater energy independence; the stated purpose of the
Washington CFS would be to reduce GHG emissions from
transportation fuels. Far from inhibiting the federal standard, the
Washington CFS actually serves as a complement. Therefore, it is
unlikely that a CFS in Washington would be preempted by the Clean Air
Act.

